The government’s killing of “El Mencho” on February 22 triggered a wave of cartel violence that in some ways appeared unprecedented. Yet history suggests that such dramatic shows of force by criminal groups are often temporary and frequently represent a final surge before fragmentation and decline.
Violence spread across at least 20 Mexican states and included widespread road blockades on major urban routes following the army operation that killed eight suspected members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), among them presumed leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes. At least 25 National Guard members also died in the incident.
CJNG’s speed of response and geographic reach stood out. Authorities recorded 252 blockades in 20 locations, though the true figure was likely higher.
Brookings Institution analyst Vanda Felbab-Brown noted that the unrest was nationwide in character, with CJNG factions reacting across large portions of Mexico. According to her, the events revealed tighter internal coordination than many observers had previously assumed.
Even so, CJNG does not resemble a full insurgency. Former intelligence officer and organized crime researcher Jaime López-Aranda observed that cartel operatives largely avoided direct battles with state forces and did not target hardened sites such as military bases or police stations.
He stressed that the events should not be compared to the Viet Cong’s 1968 Tet Offensive, arguing the cartel is not a true paramilitary force despite projecting that image.
Mexico has seen similar episodes before. After the 2010 killing of Gulf Cartel leader Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén (“Tony Tormenta”), intense clashes erupted. Likewise, following the 2009 death of Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, his organization retaliated against relatives of marines allegedly involved in the operation.
The Zetas became especially notorious for these public displays. Originating from Mexican special forces and once allied with the Gulf Cartel, they popularized large-scale “narcobloqueos,” including dozens of blockades in Monterrey after one leader’s arrest.
These blockades served multiple purposes: distracting authorities, restricting mobility, enabling escapes, and projecting the image of cartel dominance. Although they could be organized by relatively small groups, they created the perception of overwhelming presence.
For a time, the strategy worked. The Zetas expanded rapidly — averaging 33 new municipalities per year between 1998 and 2010 — fueled partly by their fearsome reputation. But at their peak, they began to fragment due to structural weaknesses and leadership arrests, eventually splintering into a shadow of their former strength. The Gulf Cartel and the Beltrán Leyva Organization suffered similar fates.
CJNG shares several characteristics with the Zetas. Its core includes former security personnel, and it has expanded aggressively under the slogan “align with us or die.” The group operates across multiple criminal markets, from drug trafficking to fuel theft and human smuggling.
This has produced a franchise-style structure in which local bosses manage day-to-day operations. Such decentralization ultimately undermined the Zetas when they lost control over semi-autonomous cells, especially in low-barrier crimes like extortion.
From early on, CJNG appeared determined to avoid that outcome. One of its first major public acts — dumping 35 alleged Zetas bodies in Veracruz — carried the implicit message that it could act as a parallel authority protecting communities from predatory rivals. The group later reinforced this image through social media, text campaigns, and propaganda.
Analysts note that CJNG has successfully built both real and symbolic power through highly visible demonstrations of firepower online and offline. The group’s ability to mobilize nationwide after Mencho’s death shows it retains significant operational capacity.
What remains uncertain is whether that cohesion will endure without its longtime leader. CJNG’s flexible model — relying variously on alliances, pacts, or outright dominance depending on the region — has fueled its expansion but may also carry long-term risks.
For now, however, experts interviewed by InSight Crime consider the cartel resilient, pointing in particular to its diversified revenue streams and decentralized command structure.
Felbab-Brown concluded that CJNG is nowhere near the kind of collapse that befell the Zetas a decade ago.